The Truth Booth

Some people claim that the concept or term truth does not refer to a real property of sentences or propositions. They say that the proposition “2 + 2 = 4 is true” is logically equivalent to the proposition “2 + 2 = 4”, making the phrase “is true” completely dispensable in this and every other context. These positions are broadly described

• as deflationary theories of truth, since they attempt to deflate the presumed importance of the words “true” or truth,
• as disquotational theories, to draw attention to the disappearance of the quotation marks in cases like the above example, or
• as minimalist theories of truth.

Whichever term is used, deflationary theories can be said to hold in common that “[t]he predicate ‘true’ is an expressive convenience, not the name of a property requiring deep analysis.” Once we have identified the truth predicate’s formal features and utility, deflationists argue, we have said all there is to be said about truth. Among the theoretical concerns of these views is to explain away those special cases where it does appear that the concept of truth has peculiar and interesting properties.

In addition to highlighting such formal aspects of the predicate “is true”, some deflationists point out that the concept enables us to express things that might otherwise require infinitely long sentences. For example, one cannot express confidence in Michael’s accuracy by asserting the endless sentence:

Michael says, ’snow is white’ and snow is white, or he says ‘roses are red’ and roses are red or he says … etc.

But it can be expressed succinctly by saying: Whatever Michael says is true.